Being involved in a hit and run can be very nerve wracking, it is easy to make bad decisions after the incident but getting the right advice can be very important.
A commonly asked question is whether the involved party should report the car stolen following the hit and run accident. the short answer to this question is it is not advisable in that the report could result in additional felony charges if the crime is detected. This reaction seems to be the way to go to many people in that they think they can cover up the hit and run. The better option is to retain the services of a local criminal defense attorney who can advise the individual of proper courses of action. Routinely, a detective or police investigator will call the suspected party in an attempt to extract inculpatory or incriminating admissions. Here, again the person would be well advised to have a lawyer on retainer to act as an intermediary, counselor and insulator from law enforcement and the danger of bad knee jerk decisions. A lawyer can insulate you from pointed questions that are sure to be difficult to answer such as whether you were drinking prior to the incident.
Having the right and accurate legal advice during this very turbulent time is crucial to a favorable and just outcome of the case. The biggest mistake you can make is to listen to and follow the advise of a non-lawyer such as a friend, co-worker or relative.
A hit and run lawyer familiar with the specific issues and important concerns a person has facing life changing choices, can make all the difference in hit and run cases. Call and speak to a legal professional who can point you in the right direction, toll free at 1-877-213-4453.
Here the Appeals Court ruled that the criminal courts cannot punish a DUI as a felony simply because the accused had a prior punishment of felony drunk driving as a juvenile.
The facts are as follows, In 2006, when Lopes was 17 years old, she pled no contest to felony DUI with injury. She was detained as a ward of the juvenile court and confined to a DUI Youth Program for 38 months. In 2014, Lopes was charged with DUI and driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. Both charges were alleged as felonies pursuant to section 23550.5 due to the prior juvenile adjudication. The trial court ruled that her juvenile adjudication could not be used to elevate the DUI to a felony. The People appealed. Held: Affirmed. Section 23550.5 allows a current DUI that would otherwise be a misdemeanor to be elevated to a felony if the defendant had a prior “violation” of section 23153 that was punished as a felony. Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that “an order adjudging a minor to be a ward . . . shall not be deemed a conviction . . . for any purpose.” The People argued that because section 23550.5 uses the term “violation” rather than “conviction” it avoids this bar. The Court of Appeal disagreed and concluded that nothing in the statutory language, legislative history, or case law indicates that the Legislature intended the phrase “violation . . . that was punished as a felony” to encompass juvenile adjudications. The Legislature knows how to include juvenile adjudications in provisions that may elevate the penalty for new offenses. (See, e.g., Veh. Code, § 13105; Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3).) The rule of lenity counsels against the People’s construction. Moreover, the juvenile adjudication does not qualify because it was not punished as a felony. (CCAP)
In the criminal case of California vs. Forrest the Appeals a Court found that a condition that the defendant stay away from weapons was unreasonable. Here are the case details:
Forrest was convicted of multiple offenses arising from an attack on her sister-in-law. On appeal, Forrest challenged three probation conditionstwo prohibited the possession of weapons or any instrument used as a weapon, the third prohibited Forrest from being in the presence of weaponsas being unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad.
Held: Affirmed as to two conditions; third condition modified. One condition prohibited Forrest from possessing weapons, including replicas. She argued that the word “replica” and inclusion of “any instrument used as a weapon” rendered the condition vague. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the condition gives fair notice of what is prohibited and that reasonable persons would understand the condition when read in context. Further, the condition prohibiting possession of a weapon is not overbroad because it fails to contain an exception for transitory possession of a weapon for self-defense. When a probationer has been convicted of a violent crime, imposition of a strict probation condition prohibiting possession of weapons is essential to public safety and it is reasonable to exclude a reference to self-defense to ensure that Forrest does not believe she is permitted to own or possess a weapon in anticipation of the possible need for self-defense. The third condition, prohibiting Forrest from being in the presence of weapons, should be modified to restrict her presence at locations where weapons are illegally present, given the widespread presence of arm security guards in buildings and other locals. As currently worded, the term impinges on her freedom of association, and her access to courts. Further, it is not narrowly tailored to safeguard these fundamental rights while restricting her conduct in a way that is designed to protect public safety. Thanks CCAP.
In this criminal case the appeals court said it was alright to exclude a probationer from going to Kohls after being convicted of theft. Contreras pled no contest to felony second degree commercial burglary for stealing seven pairs of jeans from Sears and to felony possession of drugs. At the time of the offenses, he was on misdemeanor probation for two prior burglaries, one for burglarizing a Kohl’s. The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted three years of formal probation with various conditions. One condition required that he stay out of all Kohl’s stores and of all Sears stores. On appeal, Contreras raised a number of issues, including that the Kohl’s probation condition was vague, overbroad, and unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486. Held: Affirmed on this point. The Kohl’s condition is not unreasonable under the Lent test. Even though Contreras’ current conviction was for stealing from Sears, he has victimized both Sears and Kohl’s in the past (this was his fourth commercial burglary) and therefore the condition is related to the crime for which he was convicted. Additionally, the condition is reasonably related to his future criminality, as his crimes are intimately related to the retail function of the stores and the condition will prevent him from further victimizing these businesses. Contreras also argued that the Kohl’s condition was overbroad because it burdened his right to travel, but the court reasoned that the condition was narrowly tailored to protect Kohl’s from further theft. His argument that the condition is unconstitutionally vague because it does not contain a knowledge requirement lacked merit: “Given the signage on modern retail establishments, we fail to see how one could unknowingly enter a Kohl’s store.” CCAP.
Long time Torrance criminal defense attorney George Bird is the newest member of the Los Angeles County Superior Court as he began his assignment in downtown Metro Court, Division 60. The assignment is considered one of the toughest for any bench officer due to its high case load of criminal matters, primarily DUI and driving on suspended license. Judge Bird has already received accolades from members of the defense bar for his level of professionalism, fairness and congeniality on the bench.
“I was entrapped by the police”. This is often heard when the police engage in sting operations to catch a criminal. But when is police conduct entrapment versus good police work? In California, entrapment occurs if the following three circumstances existed: (1) an officer communicated with the defendant before he committed the crime with which he was charged, (2) the officer’s communication included an inducement to commit the crime, and (3) the inducement was such that it would have motivated a “normally law-abiding per- son” to commit it.
What about sting operations? Most people agree that it is distasteful for officers to entice people to break laws that the officers are sworn to enforce. As the California Supreme Court observed, it’s the job of officers “to investigate, not instigate, crime.” This has also been asserted by the U.S. Supreme Court which said, “The function of law enforcement is the preven- tion of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime.”
But not all sting operation rise to the level of entrapment. In the words of the California Supreme Court: It is impermissible for the police or their agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime. When the police go too far, the conduct may be shown to be entrapment.
If proven, Entrapment constitutes a complete defense to a crime. This means that if a jury finds that the defendant was entrapped, he goes free. It doesn’t matter that the crime was a major felony, or that the evidence against him was over- whelming, or even that his guilt was not disputed. If he was entrapped, he is entitled to an acquittal.
Many searches occur every year in an effort to control illicit drugs. In this case the Court found the police went too far.
An officer pulled Rodriguez over for swerving his car onto the shoulder of the road then back into the lane. The officer ran a records check of Rodriguez and his passenger. After issuing Rodriguez a written warning, the officer asked if he would consent to a dog sniff of his car. Rodriquez refused. The officer ordered him out of the car and waited seven to eight minutes for another officer to arrive before conducting the dog sniff. The dog alerted and officers found a large bag of methamphetamine. Rodriquez was charged with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the drug evidence on the basis that the officer had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Vacated and remanded. The tolerable duration of a traffic stop is the amount of time necessary to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Although a driver’s license check, a warrant check, and an inspection of the automobile’s proof of insurance and registration are related to traffic safety concerns, a dog sniff “is a measure aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” It is not an ordinary part of a traffic stop. Additionally, dog sniffs that occur within a short time following completion of a traffic stop are not “de minimis” intrusions that may be justified by the government’s interest in detecting drug trafficking. An officer may only prolong a traffic stop to conduct unrelated checks, like a dog sniff, if there is reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the individual. The Court remanded so that the Eighth Circuit could consider whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez beyond the completion of the traffic infraction investigation.